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IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY 
AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVELS: 
"EVERY POWER REQUISITE"t 
Pamela J. Stephens· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade Congress has taken steps toward the for-
mulation of a comprehensive federal energy program by enacting 
several important pieces of energy legislation. That legislation em-
phasizes an implementation scheme which relies heavily upon the 
cooperation of state governments and their political subdivisions. 
The willingness of the state and local governments to engage in any 
concerted action to further national energy policy is by no means cer-
tain and the effectiveness of the federal program may, therefore, de-
pend upon the extent to which states may be compelled to par-
ticipate. While the commerce power of Congress might once have 
seemed broad enough to encompass virtually any mandate to imple-
ment federal legislation, recent decisions of the Supreme Court have 
found certain limits on that power. The Supreme Court has held that 
congressional commerce clause powers may be subject to external 
constraints imposed by the nature of our federal system of state-
federal relations and the reserved powers of the states under the 
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.1 Those Supreme Court deci-
t A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplish-
ment of the objects committed to its care, and to the completed execution of the 
trusts for which it is responsible; free from every other control, but a regard to the 
public good and to the sense of the people. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 195 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; B.A., Ohio State 
University (1971); J.D. University of Cincinnati College of Law (1975). 
1. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v. State of Indiana, 
452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
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sions have at least called into question the federal government's 
power to require state implementation of its programs. 
This article will undertake an analysis of traditional and current 
views of federalism with a view toward identifying the limits on the 
federal government's power to compel, directly or indirectly, state 
implementation of federal energy programs. The constitutional 
limits on the federal government's implementation of its policies will 
then be considered in the context of existing energy legislation. This 
examination will determine first, whether energy legislation is sub-
ject to such limits; and, second, if so, which forms of implementation 
meet the constitutional objections and thus, may be used to effect 
federal energy policy at the state level. 
II. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 
Energy as a public policy issue and federal legislation enacted as a 
response to public concern are, of course, outgrowths of the 
"Energy Crisis" in which the United States found itself in the 
mid-1970's. Declining domestic oil production and continued eco-
nomic growth led this country to increased dependence on imported 
oil and left the United States vulnerable to the 1973-1974 Arab Oil 
Embargo.2 Prior to this national emergency, the use and develop-
ment of energy resources were predominantly areas of state con-
cern. S There were exceptions which traditionally fell under federal 
regulation, for example, the development of hydroelectric power, the 
interstate transmission of electricity, and the development and use 
of nuclear power.' Nevertheless, licensing and construction of 
energy facilities and economic planning for development and use of 
energy resources remained for the most part within the decentral-
ized control of the various states. 6 
After the 1973 Energy Crisis, Congress sought to centralize cer-
tain decision making functions concerning energy resource use and 
development. Although the initial federal legislative response to the 
crisis sought to deal with oil production and allocation,6 Congress 
2. See generaUy ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PRoJECT AT HARVARD BUSINESS 
ScHOOL (1979) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY FUTURE]; Roberts & Stewart, Energy and the En-
vironment, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES 411 (H. Owens & C. Schultz, eds. 1976). 
3. Fischer, Allocating Decisionmaking in the Field of Energy Reswrce DevelrYp'TrlRnt, 22 
ARIz. L. REv. 785, 786 (1980). 
4. [d. at 818-19, nn. 205-206. 
5. Id. at 815-20. 
6. See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. 55 751-76O(h) (1976 & 
Supp. IV 1980); Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. 55 761-786 (1976 & 
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later sought to develop a multi-faceted energy plan which would 
decrease the need for foreign oil, promote the production of tradi-
tional and alternative domestic energy resources, and encourage 
conservation of finite resources. Federal efforts in this area cul-
minated during President Carter's Administration, when Congress 
passed several pieces of legislation encompassing a broad range of 
energy issues. Federal energy legislation passed during this period 
includes the Department of Energy Organization Act, 7 the National 
Energy Act,8 the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act,9 and the 
Energy Security Act.10 These statutes form the core of the nation's 
energy plan,l1 and a brief examination of them will reveal the scope 
of that plan. 
A. The Department of Energy 
Prior to establishment of the Department of Energy as a cabinet-
level agency, federal energy responsibilities were handled by more 
than forty federal agencies and offices.12 As part of the National 
Supp. IV 1980); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. SS 6201-6422 (1976 & 
Supp. IV 1980); and Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. SS 751-76O(h) 
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
7. Pub. L. No. 95-91, Stat. 565 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 3, 5, 7, 12, 15, 42 
U.S.C.). 
8. The National Energy Act is actually a package consisting of five separate acts. These are: 
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. SS 3301-3432 (Supp. II 1978); Powerplant and In-
dustrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. SS U.S.C. SS 8301-8483 (Supp. II 1978); Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 16, 30, 42, 43 U.S.C.); National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 
95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 42 U.S.C.); Energy Tax 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
9. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 15, 26, 
31, 42, 43 U.S.C.). 
10. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 42, 50 
U.S.C.). 
11. One portion of the Carter National Energy Plan which was not passed by Congress was 
the Priority Energy Project Act (pEP A), S. 1308, 96th Congo 2d Sess. 17 (1980), which would 
have created an Energy Mobilization Board (EMB) to oversee an expedited process for 
federal, state and local decisionmaking, permitting and licensing regarding certain designated 
energy development projects. Seen by many as the cornerstone of Carter's energy policy, it 
was rejected by a coalition of congressmen consisting of environmentalists, who feared its 
power to override certain environmental regulations; states' righters, who were concerned 
with the EMB's power to bypass state and local laws; and those who feared the Board might 
become yet another bureaucratic layer impeding the new energy projects. For discussion of 
PEP A, the EMB, and anticipated problems with that legislation, see Fischer, supra note 3. See 
also 124 CONGo REC. (1981) proposal by Senator Jackson, S. 668, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) 
also entitled "The Priority Energy Project Act." 
12. For a listing of the federal agencies and their energy responsibilities at the time of the 
Arab oil embargo, see FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATION STUDY TEAM, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULA-
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Energy Plan, President Carter proposed a single agency, the 
Department of Energy, with responsibility for both existing energy 
programs and planning. Congress quickly approved that proposal 
through legislation, the Department of Energy Organizational Act.ls 
The Department of Energy replaced the principal energy planning 
agencies: The Federal Energy Administration;I' the Federal Power 
Commission;16 and the Energy Research and Development Ad-
ministration.16 In addition, the Department of Energy assumed 
energy responsibilities previously exercised by other agencies and 
cabinet departments under a broad mandate: to implement a coor-
dinated national energy policy, to create and implement a com-
prehensive energy conservation scheme, to develop alternative 
renewable energy resources, and to assure an adequate and reliable 
supply of energy at the lowest reasonable cost.17 
B. The National Energy Act 
The Department of Energy's substantive mandate, the National 
Energy Act, was not enacted until almost a year after the depart-
ment's organizational act.1S As introduced, the Act was a single com-
prehensive bill, and it passed the House of Representatives in that 
form. The Senate, after major revisions, divided the Act into five 
separate bills and it was finally enacted in that form. Together, these 
laws, which are briefly set out in the following sections, reflect a 
determination to create a coherent long-term federal energy policy. 
TION: AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY Apr. 21, 1974 (FERC). 
13. Pub. L. No. 95-91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified in scatterd sections of 3, 5, 7, 12, 15, 42 
U.S.C.). 
14. Established by the Federal Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. SS 761-786 (1976 & 
Supp. IV 1980). 
15. Established in 1930 and granted broad jurisdiction under both the Natural Gas Act, 15 
U.S.C. 55 717-771(w) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. SS 
791-828(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
16. Established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. S§ 5801-5891 (1976 & 
Supp. IV 1980). 
17. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §S 101, 102, 91 Stat. 567. 
Although DOE was given responsibility for most energy functions, Congress left some impor-
tant tasks to other agencies. Agencies which continue to have significant energy respon-
sibilities include the Departments of Interior, Transportation, and Agriculture, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of DOE, see Grainey, Recent Federal Energy LeUislation: Toward a National 
Energy Policy At Last?, 12 ENVT'L L. 29, 32-41 (1981). 
18. There is reason to believe that some of the organizational difficulties which DOE has en-
countered may be attributable to the delay in enactment of the National Energy Act. See 
Grainey, supra note 17 at 39. 
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1. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 197819 
As a part of a national energy plan, the Carter administration pro-
posed the gradual decontrol of domestic natural gas prices in order 
to allow those prices to rise to a level competitive with foreign 
sources of natural gas.20 The Natural Gas Policy Act, as finally 
enacted, sets up a complicated pricing scheme whereby the price ceil-
ing for natural gas is tied to various escalator clauses corresponding 
to a number of different categories of natural gas.21 New natural 
gas-gas produced from new reservoirs after April 20, 1977 -may be 
sold at the highest price level and, as of January 1, 1985, will not be 
subject to price controls.22 As of January 1, 1985, existing gas 
previously sold only intrastate will also be decontrolled, but existing 
interstate gas will remain subject to price controls.23 In its original 
form the National Energy Act also proposed a similar pricing 
scheme for oil,24 but the provision was omitted entirely from the final 
legislation passed by the Congress. 
2. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 197825 
The stated purposes of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use 
Act are: (1) to reduce the importation of petroleum and increase the 
nation's capability to use indigenous energy resources; (2) to con-
serve natural gas and petroleum; and (3) to encourage the greater 
use of coal and other alternate fuels as a primary energy source. All 
these objectives are directed toward attaining the ultimate goal of 
reducing "the vulnerability of the United States to energy supply in-
terruptions."26 The Act attempts to further these goals by pro-
hibiting the use of oil or natural gas in new electric generating sta-
tions27 and industrial installations28 unless the Secretary of Energy 
grants an exemption.29 The Act also prohibits the use of oil and 
natural gas by existing plants and installations after January 1, 
19. 15 U.S.C. §s 3301-3432 (Supp. II 1978). 
20. [d. SS 3331-3333. 
21. [d. SS 3311-3320. 
22. [d. S§ 3313, 3331. 
23. [d. S 3319. 
24. The National Energy Plan, 13 WEEKLY COMPo OF PRES. Doc. 620, 621 (May 2, 1977). 
25. 42 U.S.C. SS 8301-8483 (Supp. II 1978). 
26. [d. S 8301(a). 
27. [d. § 8311. 
28. [d. § 8312. 
29. [d. § 8321(a). 
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1990, subject to specified exemptions,30 and limits the use of natural 
gas in outdoor decorative lighting, again subject to specified exemp-
tions.31 All such exemptions must be granted on a case-by-case 
basis.32 
Subchapter VI of the Act provides for financial assistance from the 
federal government to an area within a state which has experienced 
rapid growth due to coal or uranium production development. 33 The 
governor of the state must advise the federal government when such 
increased development has caused an increased need for housing or 
public services for which the state and local governments serving the 
area lack the financial resources.34 This federal assistance may take 
the form of planning grants36 or land acquisition and development 
grants.36 In addition to such assistance to areas impacted by in-
creased coal or uranium production, Subchapter VI authorizes the 
Secretary of Energy to make a loan to the owner or operator of any 
existing electric powerplant which is converting to coal or other 
alternative fuel designated under the Act. The purpose of such a loan 
is to finance the purchase and installation of any air pollution control 
equipment required as a result of the conversion. 37 
3. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 197838 
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURP A) principally 
seeks to encourage conservation of energy supplied by electric and 
natural gas utilities.39 Congress determined that conservation of oil 
and natural gas by electricity utilities is essential to the success of 
any effort to decrease dependence on foreign oil, avoid shortages, 
and control consumer costs. In making this determination, Congress 
took into account that the generation of electricity consumed more 
than 25 percent of all energy resources used in the United States,40 
and that electric utilities relied heavily upon the use of oil and natural 
gas.41 
30. [d. 55 8341, 8342, 8352. 
31. [d. 5 8372(a), (c). 
32. [d. 5 8321(a). 
33. [d. 5 8401(a). 
34. [d. 
35. [d. 5 8401(b). 
36. [d. 5 8401(c). 
37. [d. 58402(a). 
38. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42, 43 
u.s.c.). 
39. [d. SS 101, 301. 
40. S. REp. No. 442, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1977). 
41. [d. at 9. 
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Titles I and III of PURP A, which relate to the regulation of elec-
tricity and gas utilities respectively, share three goals: (1) to en-
courage conservation of energy supplied by utilities; (2) to encourage 
the efficient use of facilities and resources by utilities; and (3) to en-
courage equitable rates to consumers.42 In order to achieve these 
goals, Titles I and III direct state utility regulatory commissions and 
nonregulated utilities to "consider" certain specified federal stand-
ards and to make a determination whether to implement each stand-
ard.43 These federal standards include five different approaches to 
structuring rates which can be used by states. Under the PURP A 
scheme, energy rates can be set: (1) by reflecting in those rates the 
costs of providing electric service to each class of consumers; (2) by 
eliminating declining block rates; (3) by adopting time-of-day rates; 
(4) by using seasonal and interruptible rates; and (5) by using load 
management techniques.44 PURP A also requires each state reg-
ulatory authority and nonregulated utility to consider adoption of a 
set of standards governing the terms and conditions of electricity 
service.45 For example, those standards would prohibit master-
metering in new buildings and result in promulgation of procedural 
requirements relating to termination of service.46 
In addition to the requirement that states take into account these 
federal standards, PURPA's Titles I and III also prescribe certain 
procedures to be followed by the state regulatory authority when 
considering the proposed standards. These procedures require that 
each federal standard be examined at a public hearing after notice 
and that a written statement be made available to the public regard-
ing any reasons why a standard is not adopted by the stateY The 
Secretary of Energy has the right to intervene and participate in any 
rate-related proceeding considering the Title I or III standards.48 
42. Pub. L. No. 95-617, SS 101 & 301, 92 Stat. 3120 & 3149,16 u.s.c. S 2611 (1976 & Supp. 
IY 1980), 15 U.S.C. S 3201 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
43. [d. SS 111, 303, 304, 306, 92 Stat. 3121, 3150-52. 
44. [d. S 111, 92 Stat. 3121. Declining block rates represent a traditional ratemaking ap-
proach which sets the highest unit rate for basic electrical consumption, with declining rates 
for each block of additional consumption. Time-of-day and seasonal rates operate to reduce 
peak load by imposing higher rates during periods of highest demand. Interruptible rates 
charge less for service which the utility can stop during peak demand periods. Load manage-
ment techniques are methods used to reduce the demand for electricity at certain peak times. 
45. [d. S 113, 16 U.S.C. S 2623 & S 303, 15 U.S.C. S 3203. 
46. [d. 
47. [d. S 111, 92 Stat. 3121. 
48. [d. SS 121 & 305, 92 Stat. 3128 & 3152. 
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PURP A also sets forth certain reporting requirements49 for state 
regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities. 
Despite the extent and detail of the above mentioned federal stand-
ards, the Act makes it clear that there is no requirement that a state 
regulatory authority or nonregulated utility adopt any or all of the 
federal standards. As expressed in the Act, "[n]othing ... prohibits 
any state regulatory authority or nonregulated electric utility from 
making any determination that it is not appropriate to implement 
any such standard, pursuant to its authority under otherwise ap-
plicable state law."50 
Section 210 of PURPA's Title II seeks to encourage the further 
development of cogeneration and small power production facilities,51 
with the aim of reducing the demand for traditional fossil fuels. To 
accomplish that aim section 210(a) directs the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC),52 in consultation with state reg-
ulatory authorities, to "promulgate such rules as it determines 
necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power pro-
duction."58 Section 210(f) requires each state regulatory authority 
and nonregulated utility to implement FERC rules.54 FERC is also 
given authority to prescribe rules exempting cogeneration and small 
power facilities from certain state and federal laws which govern 
electricity utilities. 55 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the PURP A rE!gulatory 
scheme which Congress enacted is arguably the most intrusive of the 
recent energy proposals in terms of requiring state compliance and 
implementation and was subjected to a constitutional ehallenge 
almost immediately. 56 
49. [d. 16 U.S.C. S 2626(a); 15 U.S.C. § 3209(a). 
50. [d. SIll, 92 Stat. 3121. 
51. 92 Stat. 3144, 16 U.S.C. S 824a-3. A cogeneration facility produces both electric energy 
and some other useful form of energy, such as steam. A small power production facility is one 
which has a production capacity of no more than 8 megawatts and uses bioma.ss, waste or 
renewable resources (e.g., wind or solar) to produce electricity. [d. 
52. FERC is an independent regulatory commission within the Department of Energy, 
which has assumed many of the functions of the Federal Power Commission, under the 
Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act, as well as assuming new functions under the National 
Energy Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 7171-7177 (1982). 
53. Pub. L. No. 95-617, S 210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a). 
54. [d. S 210(f), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f). 
55. [d. S 210(e), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e). 
56. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). See infra text and notes at notes 201-208. 
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4. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act57 
The National Energy Conservation Policy Act reflects the view 
that a long range energy policy in this country must include 
measures which seek to reduce the rate of growth of demand for 
nonrenewable energy resources. 58 Significant incentives are pro-
vided in the Act for conservation measures undertaken pursuant to 
residential energy conservation programs59 and energy conservation 
programs for schools, hospitals, local goverment buildings, and 
public care institutions.60 In addition, the Act provides for civil 
penalties to be imposed by the Secretary of Transportation on the 
automobile industry for failure to meet fuel economy standards61 and 
requires the Secretary of Energy to establish energy efficiency 
standards for certain products.62 
The scheme by which these conservation measures are to be im-
plemented is essentially one of federal-state cooperation. The states 
are required to submit an energy conservation plan for the approval 
of the Secretary of Energy.63 Such a plan must comply with stand-
ards promulgated by the Department of Energy.64 Failure to pro-
mulgate a plan within the time-limits set by the National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act or failure of the state to "adequately" im-
plement an approved plan will result in promulgation of a plan for 
that state by the Secretary of Energy.65 
5. The Energy Tax Act of 197866 
The Energy Tax Act (ETA) also is designed to encourage the pro-
duction and conservation of energy, but the ETA proposes to do so 
through a scheme of tax incentives and penalties. The only signifi-
cant tax penalty to survive the Senate is the Gas Guzzler Tax, which 
imposes a tax on the sale by a manufacturer of automobiles which fall 
short of acceptable fuel economy standards.67 The tax is limited in its 
57. Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 23, 42 
U.S.C.). 
58. See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 2. 
59. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, §§ 210-255, 92 Stat. 
3209-3238 (1978). 
60. [d. §§ 301-312, 92 Stat. 3238-3254. 
61. [d. § 402, 92 Stat. 3255. 
62. [d. § 422, 92 Stat. 3259. 
63. [d. § 212, 92 Stat. 3211. 
64. [d. 
65. [d. 
66. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3175 (codified in scattered sections of 23, 26 U.S.C.). 
67. [d. § 201, 92 Stat. 3180. 
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application to automobiles weighing less than 6,000 pounds and 
those manufactured primarily for use on public streets and 
highways.68 Expressly exempted are trucks, ambulances, and police 
vehicles. 69 
In addition to that tax, the ETA provides for various tax credits: 
residential energy credits for insulating or other energy conserva-
tion measures;70 investment credit for purchase of vans for "car 
pooling"71 and; business investment credits for conversion from or 
conservation of oil and gas.72 
C. The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 198073 
Mter passage of the National Energy Act in a form much altered 
from that originally proposed, the Carter administration approached 
Congress in 1979 and 1980 with a series of new energy proposals. 
One legislative proposal was for a gradual decontrol of domestic 
crude oil,74 accompanied by a tax on the resulting oil producer prof-
its, called the Windfall Profits Tax. The Windfall Profits Tax was 
crucial to the administration's energy plan in an economic sense 
because it would fund certain other energy programs and assistance 
for low income consumers adversely affected by higher fuel costS.76 
As finally enacted, the Windfall Profits Tax Act provides for a lower 
overall tax than that sought by the administration,76 but it provides 
for a broader scheme of tax credits for the development of renewable 
energy resources.77 The Act also provides for block grants' to states 
to assist low-income families with heating and cooling costS.78 
D. The Energy Security Act79 
The last of the major energy bills passed during the Carter ad-
ministration was the Energy Security Act, which, as proposed, dealt 
68. fd. S 201(b)(1)(A), 92 Stat. 3181. 
69. fd. S 201(b)(1)(C), 92 Stat. 3181. 
70. fd. S 101, 92 Stat. 3175. 
71. fd. S 241, 92 Stat. 3192. 
72. fd. S 301, 92 Stat. 3194. 
73. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 15,26,31,42, 
43 U.S.C.). 
74. fd. 
75. fd. S 102(b)(1), 94 Stat. 229, 255. 
76. fd. S 202, 94 Stat. 258. 
77. fd. 
78. fd. SS 301·313, 94 Stat. 288-99. 
79. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 42, 50 
U.S.C.). 
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only with the development of synthetic fuels, but as enacted is much 
broader. The focus of the Energy Security Act is on the development 
of alternative types of fuel. In addition to synthetic fuels,80 the Act 
provides for loan guarantees,81 price guarantees82 and government 
purchase agreements83 in order to promote biomass and alcohol 
fuels,84 solar energy,86 and geothermal energy.86 Significantly, the 
Act also requires the establishment of a research program on the 
acid rain problem as it relates to the increased use of coal and coal 
derivatives. 87 
E. Summary of Federal Energy Legislation 
By enacting the various energy acts outlined above, the Congress 
made use of several different forms of implementing federal policies, 
including the use of conditional grants to induce cooperation, }'arious 
directives to state regulatory bodies, and the full or partial preemp-
tion of the states' authority to regulate certain activities. Some of 
these statutes, particularly PURP A, raise constitutional questions 
concerning the possible limits of the federal government's power to 
compel state compliance with its energy plan. 
III. THE FEDERALISM DILEMMA 
As the discussion of recent federal energy legislation illustrates, 
the federal government has attempted to formulate an energy policy 
which is national in scope. Nevertheless, the strong federal interest 
and action in establishing this comprehensive energy policy "does 
not ... operate in virgin territory."88 Energy development and use 
have traditionally been state and local concerns and federal energy 
regulation often is in conflict with state and local interests.89 Given 
these conflicts, the question remains whether or under what cir-
cumstances the federal government has the power to mandate state 
compliance with an implementation of national energy legislation. 
80. [d. SS 115, 116, 191, 94 Stat. 611, 636-38, 681. 
81. [d. SS 131, 133, 94 Stat. 654-58, 660-61. 
82. [d. SS 131, 134, 94 Stat. 654-58, 661. 
83. [d. SS 301-304 (to be codified at 42 U.S.c. SS 7361-7364). 
84. [d. S 211(a), 94 Stat. 686. 
85. [d. S 505, 94 Stat. 722. 
86. [d. S 611, 94 Stat. 763. 
87. [d. SS 701-706,94 Stat. 770-74. 
88. Fischer, supra note 3 at 785. 
89. See id. (discussing competing state and federal interests in the energy area and federal 
attempts to accommodate those competing interests). 
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A. The Constitutional Basis for Energy Legislation 
The enactment of federal energy laws finds constitutional support 
both in the Commerce Clause90 and the Spending Clause91 of the 
United States Constitution. Since the late 1930's the Supreme Court 
has interpreted congressional power under the Commerce Clause 
very broadly. The Court has displayed great deference to congres-
sional findings that regulated activities affect interstate commerce, 
provided there is a rational basis for such findings and the means of 
regulation "chosen by [Congress] is reasonably adapted to the end 
permitted by the Constitution."92 By 1941, the Supreme Court 
determined that the Tenth Amendment imposed no limitation on the 
exercise by Congress of its plenary commerce clause powers. The 
Court characterized the Tenth Amendment's reservation of State 
powers as "but a truism that all is retained which has not been sur-
rendered. "98 
The Supreme Court's position on the Tenth Amendment remained 
consistent over the next thirty years and, as late as 1968, the Court 
expressed its position in firm and clear language. In Maryland v. 
Wirtz,94 the Supreme Court upheld amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act which had extended the coverage of the Act to 
employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools.96 In so doing, 
the Court stated that the federal government, "when acting within 
delegated power, may override countervailing state interests 
whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in 
character. "96 
The spending power of the Congress is primarily manifested in 
energy legislation in the form of grants to the stateS.97 That power, 
the Supreme Court has held, is not limited by the other constitutional 
grants of power in Article I, section 8, but rather is limited only by 
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.' 
91. U.S. CONST. art. I S 8, cl. 1. 
92. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
93. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). The Tenth Amendment provides that 
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST., amendment 
X. 
94. 392 U.S. 182 (1968), overruled lYy National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 
(1976). 
95. 392 U.S. at 193-99. 
96. Id. at 195. 
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 1. 
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the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general 
welfare of the United StateS.98 In a 1937 case, Steward Machine Co. 
v. Davis,99 the Court indicated that the Tenth Amendment might 
pose a limit on federal spending in the situation in which a state was 
"coerced" rather than "induced" to accept federal funds. loo The 
Court has not, however, invalidated a federal spending program on 
that basis.lOl 
B. The Doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery 
A major shift in the Court's view of state sovereignty vis a vis 
federal regulation came in its 1976 decision, National League of 
Cities v. Usery.102 That decision overruled Maryland v. Wirtz l03 and 
held unconstitutional the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, which extended both miminum wage and maximum hour 
provisions to the employees of states and their political 
subdivisions. lo4 Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion focused not 
upon the rationality of Congress's exercise of its commerce clause 
powers, but instead upon the sovereignty of the States, "which may 
not be impaired by Congress."106 The Court characterized the issue 
before it as "whether these determinations [as to employee wages 
and hours] are 'functions essential to separate and independent ex-
istence,' ... so that Congress may not abrogate the States' other-
wise plenary authority to make them."lo6 
The factor which distinguished National League of Cities from 
other commerce clause cases in Justice Rehnquist's view, was that 
these challenged federal regulations were imposed upon the "States 
as States" rather than directed against private individuals "who are 
necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of federal and state 
governments."107 As to the latter, the Tenth Amendment is no bar-
rier to federal regulation. As to the former, it may so serve. The 
98. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
99. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
100. Id. at 585-90. 
101. But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) in which the Court found that the 
Eleventh Amendment may bar federal court actions by private parties seeking expenditure of 
state funds, even where the state violated federal regulations under a federal spending pro-
gram. 
102. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
103. Id. at 855. 
104. Id. at 852. 
105. Id. at 845. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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Court declined, however, to reach the question whether this newly 
established Tenth Amendment limitation extended beyond the Com-
merce Clause to congressional action under powers granted by the 
Spending Clause of the Constitution. lOS 
The plurality opinion held that "insofar as the challenged amend-
ments operate to directly displace the State's freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, 
they are not within the authority granted Congress of Art. 1, § 8, cl. 
3."109 Neither the term "integral operations" nor "areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions" was defined by the Court except in-
sofar as the power to determine wages and hours was characterized 
as an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty,"UO and "fire 
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks 
and recreation" were said to be integral governmental functions.ul 
Justice Blackmun, the fifth member of the National League oj 
Cities majority, filed a separate concurrence in which he indicated 
that he joined the majority with the understanding that "it adopts a 
balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such 
as environmental protection, where the federal interest is de-
monstrably greater and where state facility compliance with im-
posed federal standards would be essential."1l2 
The Supreme Court's decision in National League oj Cities was 
subjected to extensive analysis and much criticism. us Both courts 
and commentators sought to formulate workable standards within 
which federal regulations might be considered, and to define the 
outer limits of the National League oj Cities doctrine.1l4 
108. [d. at 852 n.17 ("We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if 
Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority 
granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I. S 8, Cl. 
1, or S 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
109. [d. 
110. [d. at 845. 
111. [d. at 851. 
112. [d. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
113. See, e.g., Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of Sovereignty in 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National 
League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Serv-
ices, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1977); Beard & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing 
N.L.C., 11 GA. L. REv. 35 (1977); Ripple & Kenyan, State Sovereignty-A Polished But Slip-
pery Crown, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw 745 (1979); Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth 
Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1871 (1976); Comment, Redefining 
The National League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine, 129 U. PENN. L. REV. 1460 (1981). 
114. [d. See, e.g., United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 
1980) rev'd, 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 
1979); Peel v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Best, 
573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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C. The Surface Mining Act Cases 
Five years after National League of Cities, the Supreme Court 
again took up the central issues posed by that case.115 Once again, 
the Court's opinion left many questions unanswered. In Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc.,116 and 
Hodel v. State of Indiana, 117 challenges were made to the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Surface Mining Act)118 
on the ground that the "steep slope"119 and "prime farmland"l20 
provisions violated the Tenth Amendment's limitation on congres-
sional commerce power. The district court in each case, relying upon 
National League of Cities, concluded that the Surface Mining Act 
contravened the Tenth Amendment because it interfered with the 
States' "traditional governmental function" of regulating land 
use. l2l 
In the Virginia Surface Mining case, the invalidated provisions of 
the Act, sections 1265(d) and (e), prescribe performance standards 
for surface coal mining on steep slopes. l22 These standards require 
steep slope operators to: (1) reclaim the mined area by completely 
covering the highwall and returning the site to its appropriate 
original contour; (2) refrain from dumping spoiled material on the 
downslope below the mining cut; and (3) refrain from disturbing land 
above the highwall unless permitted to do so by the regulatory 
authority. While these provisions are directed to private operators, 
the district court decision found that the provisions impermissibly 
constrict the state's ability to make "essential decisions" through 
"forced relinquishment of state control of land use planning; through 
loss of state control of its economy; and through economic harm 
from expenditure of state funds to implement the Act and from 
115. That is not to say that the Court had not had occasion to refer to or cite National 
Leagu.e o/Cities with approval in the interim. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 
(1980); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); City 
of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
116. 452 U.S. 264 (1981), rev'g Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 
483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980). 
117. 452 U.S. 289 (1981), rev'g Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980). These 
cases, Virginia Sur/ace Mining and Hodel v. Indiana, will be referred to collectively as the 
Sur/ace Mining Act Cases. 
118. 30 U.S.C. SS 1201-1328 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
119. 30 U.S.C. S 1265(d). 
120. Id. 
121. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980); 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980). 
122. 30 U.S.C. S 1265(d)(4) defines a "steep slope" as "any slope above 20 degrees or such 
lesser slope as may be defined by the regulatory authority after consideration of soil, climate, 
and other characteristics of a region or state." Id. 
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destruction of the taxing power of certain counties, cities and 
townS."UB 
Upon direct appeal in both cases from the district court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1252, the Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming its 
position in National League of Cities that the Tenth Amendment on-
ly serves as an impediment to congressional action which seeks to 
regulate the "States as StateS."l24 The Supreme Court stated: 
Congressional Power over areas of private endeavor, even when 
its exercise may preempt express state-law determinations con-
trary to the result that has commended itself to the collective 
wisdom of Congress has been held to be limited only by the re-
quirement that 'the means chosen by (Congress) must be 
reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution' .126 
The Court held that in order to be successful, a claim that congres-
sional commerce power legislation is invalid under the reasoning of 
National League of Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. 
"First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute 
regulates the States as States. . .. Second, the federal regulation 
must address matters that are indisputably 'attributes of sovereign-
ty' . . . . And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance 
with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional functions.' "U6 The Tenth 
Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining Act failed, the Court 
held, because the first of these requirements was not met.l27 
The Court applied the same three-step analysis in both Surface 
Mining Act cases. Unfortunately, the second and third requirements 
set out in Virginia Surface Mining case and followed in the Indiana 
case were not explained or discussed by the Court. What constitutes 
a matter which is an "attribute of state sovereignty" or an impair-
ment of the State's ability "to structure integral operations" in such 
areas was not made clear by the Court. The Court assumed, without 
reaching the question, that "land use regulation is an 'integral 
governmental function'. "U8 
The first requirement, the one upon which the Court's decision 
turned, was dealt with at length. The Court noted that, under the 
123. 483 F. Supp. at 435. Although the Act allows a state to elect to have its own regulatory 
program, the district court held that this was not a real choice since the state program must 
comply with federally prescribed standards. [d. 
124. 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981). 
125. [d. at 286. 
126. [d. at 288. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. at 293 n.34. 
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Surface Mining Act, a state is not compelled to enforce the Act's pro-
visions, nor is it required to expend any state funds or "to participate 
in the federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever."129 
The Act as formulated permits a state to participate by submitting a 
proposed permanent program that complies with the Act, but if a 
state does not wish to do so, the full regulatory burden is upon the 
federal government. ISO The Court observed that this statutory 
scheme was not one whereby the States are compelled to enact laws 
or adopt regulations to enforce a federal program. "The most that 
can be said is that the Surface Mining Act establishes a program of 
cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits estab-
lished by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their 
own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular 
needs."ISI Thus, the Court found the challenged provisions of the 
Act to be a permissible use of the legislative commerce power. 132 
The Court rejected the invitation of the States to look beyond the 
activities actually regulated by the Act to "its conceivable effects on 
the States' freedom to make decisions in areas of integral govern-
mental functions." The Court's rejection was based on the view that 
the Tenth Amendment imposes no limit on congressional power to 
preempt or displace state regulation of private activities affecting in-
terstate commerce.133 Since "Congress could constitutionally have 
enacted a statute prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal 
mining," the Court found there was no reason "why the Surface 
Mining Act should become constitutionally suspect simply because 
Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role."134 
Interestingly, Justice Marshall's majority opinion indicates that 
even if the three stated requirements are satisfied, a Tenth Amend-
ment challenge to federal commerce power legislation might fail. 
"There are situations in which the nature of the federal interest ad-
vanced may be such that it justified State submission."135 Thus, in 
dicta at least, the Court in Virginia Surface Mining adopts the 
balancing approach of Justice Blackmun' s National League of Cities 
concurrence: does a state autonomy interest exist according to the 
three express requirements; and if so, is there some "demonstrably 
129. [d. at 288. 
130. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
131. 452 U.S. at 289. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. at 288 n.29. 
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greater" federal interest which supports overriding the state in-
terest? 
Supreme Court cases after the Surface Mining Act cases continue 
to apply the analysis of those cases.136 Different prongs of the three-
pronged test have been analyzed and applied by the Court, but the 
Court has not found it necessary to resort to the balancing approach 
in order to uphold challenged federal legislation.137 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL ENERGY POLICIES 
Rules relating to the discovery, sale and use of energy, perhaps 
more than other areas of federal concern, are "caught in a quagmire 
of competing sovereignties-national, state and local. ... "138 Al-
though Congress has in the past been sensitive to state and local in-
terests in formulating energy legislation,139 complete deference to 
those interests may not be possible. In any event, the constitutional 
validity of any federal energy legislation, existing or proposed, 
which is to be implemented at the state or local level, must be tested 
against the standards established in the recent Supreme Court 
cases.140 
One logical approach to assessing the validity of such legislation is 
through use of a two-tiered analysis. First, the nature of the state or 
local function which the federal law seeks to regulate must by ascer-
tained, that is, is it an "integral" or "traditional" governmental 
function. This threshold consideration may prove to be the key con-
sideration by eliminating the need to proceed further with the 
analysis, since presumably National League of Cities has no impact 
upon federal regulation of nonintegral or nontraditional state func-
tions. Assuming an "integral" or "traditional" governmental func-
tion is regulated, the second tier of the analysis would require a con-
sideration of the form which the regulation takes, in order to 
establish whether the federal regulation operates upon the "States 
as States" and addresses matters that are indisputably attributes of 
state sovereignty. 
A. The Nature of the State Function 
Mter National League of Cities and before the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail 
136. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, _ U.S. _, 51 U.S.L.W. 4219 (March 1, 1983). 
137.Id. 
138. Fischer, supra note 3 at 785. 
139. For a full discussion of that sensitivity and how it has manifested itself, see Fischer, 
supra note 3. 
140. See supra text and notes at notes 95-135. 
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Road Company,141 lower courts struggled to formulate a workable 
definition for those protected state functions which National League 
of Cities had designated as integral or traditional,142 Unfortunately, 
after Long Island R.R., determining whether an activity is an in-
tegral government function continues to present difficulties. 
1. Longlsland R.R. Co.: The Nature of the State Function 
The Long Island Rail Road (the Railroad) is a passenger and 
freight line which, after 132 years of private ownership, was ac-
quired by New York State in 1966. After state acquisition, the 
Railroad continued to conduct collective bargaining pursuant to the 
procedures of the federal Railway Labor Act.14s In February 1980, in 
the midst of a labor dispute, the state converted the Railroad from a 
private stock corporation to a public benefit corporation. The State 
of New York then filed suit in state court seeking to enjoin the im-
pending strike by invoking the Taylor Law, 144 a state law prohibiting 
strikes by public employees. Before the State Court acted, however, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York heard the Union's suit for declaratory relief and held the 
Railroad, as an interstate carrier, subject to the Railway Labor Act 
and not the Taylor Law.145 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed/46 holding that the state's operation of the Railroad was an 
integral government function within the meaning of. National 
League of Cities and that the federal law displaced "essential govern-
mental decisions" involving that function. 147 The Second Circuit's 
opinion is an example of a federal court's attempt to bring a rea-
soned approach to this determination. Emphasizing the passenger 
service aspect of the Railroad, the court relied heavily upon the 
shared views of Professors Tribe and Michelman that the sovereign-
ty interests which National League of Cities sought to protect should 
141. See, e.g., Anersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979) 
(Municipally-owned airport is "an integral governmental function"); Public Service Co. of 
North Carolina, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 587 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 
1979) ("Texas's oil and gas business is not a 'traditional government function' "); United 
States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978) (state licensing of drivers is an integral 
governmental function). 
142. 455 U.S. 678 (1982). 
143. 45 U.S.C. SS 151-188 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
144. N.Y. CIY. SERVo LAW 55 200-214 (Consol. 1980). 
145. 509 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
146. 634 F.2d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 1980). 
147. Id. at 25-28. 
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be defined in terms of "the state's role of providing for the interests 
of its citizens in receiving important social services."148 The Second 
Circuit opinion, therefore, focused upon the importance of the public 
service furnished, that the service was one which state and local 
governments are particulary suited to provide, and that the service 
is one increasingly provided by state and local governments.149 
Although the Second Circuit's approach might appear attractive at 
first glance, it is a troublesome one. If followed, its reasoning 
represents a potentially broad limitation upon congressional exercise 
of its commerce clause power .160 In choosing to view National 
League of Cities as an effort by the Supreme Court to protect the 
rights of individuals to certain essential public services, the court for-
mulated a standard which could be extended to cover virtually any 
public service a state chooses to provide its citizens.161 That such a 
standard could seriously interfere with Congress's commerce power 
is illustrated by the Long Island R.R. case itself. Under the Second 
Circuit's reasoning, legislative judgments embodied in the Railway 
Labor Act and made applicable to the Long Island Railroad, a 
railroad which concededly has a serious impact upon interstate com-
merce,l62 were overturned in the name of protecting New York's 
ability to structure integral operations in an area of "essential" 
public service. 
The most positive aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Long 
Island R.R. is that it rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit 
and reversed that court's holding. l6S The Chief Justice's opinion for 
a unanimous Supreme Court found the Second Circuit's distinction 
between passenger and freight service to be without significance 
and, therefore, concluded that the situation in Long Island R.R. fell 
squarely within earlier railroad cases which refused to immunize 
state-owned railroads from federal regulation.164 The Court ob-
served that those cases were expressly reaffirmed in National 
League of Cities. The Court noted that although in recent years some 
148. Id. at 25 n.15. 
149. Id. at 27. 
150. For an extended discussion of the threat posed by the Long Island R.R. rationale, see 
Comment, Redefining the National League oJ Cities State SO'IJereignty Doctrine, 129 U. P A. L. 
ttEV. 1460, 1472-1475 (1981). 
151. Id. 
152. 634 F.2d at 23 ("The LIRR's freight business, while declining and less significant than 
its passenger business, still generates over $12 million in revenues derived from business in in-
terstate commerce"). 
153. 455 U.S. at 682. 
154. Id. at 685. 
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passenger railroads have come under state control, it "does not alter 
the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among the 
functions traditionally performed by state and local 
governments. "155 
Other than reiterating its earlier exemption of railroads from the 
category of integral government functions, the Court in Long Island 
R.R. offered no underlying rationale, no further definition of the 
terms "integral" or "traditional" to assist in making a determina-
tion concerning any state function other than operating a railroad. 
Moreover, an examination of the Court's opinion suggests that the 
Court possesses neither a clear view of the three separate prongs of 
the three-pronged test of Surface Mining Act Cases nor ability or 
willingness to articulate the real concerns which underlie each of 
those prongs. 
The Court analyzed Long Island R.R. under the third prong of the 
Surface Mining Act Cases standard, that is, whether "the States' 
compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability to 
structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions."156 
The Court made no attempt to distinguish that prong from the sec-
ond prong, that "the federal regulation must address matters that 
are indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty' "- if, indeed, those 
prongs may be said to refer to separate requirements. 157 In fact, the 
Chief Justice seems to confuse the two at times, commenting that 
the "National League of Cities opinion focused its delineation of the 
'attributes of sovereignty' ... on a determination as to whether the 
State's interest involved 'functions essential to separate and in-
dependent existence.' "158 This same standard is used later in the 
Long Island R.R. opinion in reference to defining traditional govern-
mental functions. 159 
In concluding that operation of a passenger railroad is "not among 
those governmental functions generally immune from federal 
regulation" under National League of Cities, the Court insisted it 
was not "looking only to the past to determine what is 
'traditional.' "160 Nonetheless, the bulk of the Court's opinion 
supporting its conclusion dealt with the long history of federal 
155. [d. (emphasis in original). 
156. [d. 
157. [d. (citing the Surface Mining Act Cases, 452 U.S. 287-288). 
158. [d. at 288 n.l1. 
159. [d. at 686. 
160. [d. 
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regulation of railroads in general and the regulation of the Long 
Island Rail Road in particular .161 
2. Implications of Long Island R.R. 
Only two things are clear from the Court's opinion in Long Island 
R.R.: first, that the Court continued to narrow the field of federal 
regulatory schemes subject to the National League of Cities doc-
trine; and, second, that the traditional or historical nature of a state 
function was specifically stated to be of significance in determining 
those state functions which trigger the special inquiry of National 
League of Cities. Although the Court alluded to other considerations 
relevant to that determination, none were actually described.162 
Long IslandR.R. does reflect a narrowed approach to the application 
of National League of Cities, but the Court shows no sign of aban-
doning that doctrine. The problem remains, then, to devise an ap-
proach to determining integral government functions which is con-
sistent with the Court's current expression of its National League of 
Cities concerns, but also consistent with the well-established view of 
the broad commerce clause powers of Congress.16S 
One such approach can be found in a system making use of pre-
sumptions and shifting burdens of proofs. The system can be il-
lustrated in application to three categories of federally regulated 
state functions: (1) Those functions historically subject tc? federal 
regulation, but which have been newly acquired by the state; (2) 
Those functions which have historically been subject to state regula-
tion or control, and which the federal government has newly 
regulated; (3) Those functions which historically have not been sub-
ject to either federal or state regulation or control. 
The first of these categories is, of course, the Long Island R.R. 
situation. In that situation the Supreme Court's opinion suggests a 
conclusive presumption that this is not a function which should trig-
ger the heightened judicial concern of National League of Cities. The 
Court stated "there is no justification for a rule which would allow 
the States, by acquiring functions previously performed by the 
private sector, to erode the federal authority in areas traditionally 
subject to federal statutory regulation."16' Creating a conclusive 
presumption in favor of the federal regulation in this situation is con-
161. [d. at 687·90. 
162. [d. at 686. 
163. See supra, text and notes at notes 84-88. 
164. 456 U.S. at 687. 
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sistent with the Supreme Court's focus in National League of Cities 
on whether the federal regulation would affect basic state pre-
rogatives in such a way as to threaten the state's ability to fulfill its 
independent role in the federal system.165 That is so because the 
state had maintained its "separate and independent existence"166 
without this newly acquired function. 167 
The second category presents the converse situation, that is, an ac-
tivity or function which historically has been subject to state control, 
but one which the federal government now seeks to regulate. Given 
the Court's emphasis in Long Island R.R. on the historical or tradi-
tional nature of the state function in determining whether the func-
tion is within that area of state activity constitutionally sheltered by 
National League of Cities, it follows that this second category is the 
most likely repository of protected functions. Maximum sensitivity 
to those protected functions can be exhibited by recognizing a rebut-
table presumption in favor of the State function as an integral func-
tion, absent a federal showing that the challenged regulation does 
not endanger the separate and independent existence of the State or 
affect the State's ability to perform its role in the federal system.16S 
The third category is perhaps the most difficult to resolve. If 
neither the state nor the federal government has exercised authority 
in a given area, how should the balance be struck consistent with the 
National League of Cities doctrine? Arriving at an answer to this 
question is aided to a large extent by the understanding that the 
Court in National League of Cities did not write upon a clean slate. A 
long history of Supreme Court cases prior to National League of 
Cities established a broad power in Congress to exercise its authori-
ty under the Commerce Clause.169 National League of Cities, as later 
elaborated upon by the Court, placed only a narrow limitation upon 
congressional exercise of that commerce power. 170 Consistent with 
the Court's views, the activities or functions which fall within the 
165. [d. 
166. [d. 
167. See _ U.S. _, 51 U.S.L.W. 4219, 4223. A variation on this category is suggested 
by the majority opinion in FERC v. Mississippi, in which Justice Blackmun makes continued 
reference to an "otherwise preemptible field," one as to which Congress might have complete-
ly preempted state action, as presumptively falling outside the class of "integral governmental 
functions." 456 U.S. 742, 748. See infra text and notes at notes 201-208. 
168. With respect to this decision, courts might consider, among other factors, the extent of 
federal interference with State functions and whether the State interest was adequately 
represented in the political decisionmaking process which resulted in the federal regulation. 
169. See, supra text and notes at notes 84-88. 
170. See, supra 95-135 text and notes at notes 95-135. 
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third category should create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the 
federal regulation, absent a showing by the state that the federal 
regulation does endanger the state's separate and independent ex-
istence. 
From the perspective of implementing federal energy legislation, 
such legislation probably would fall with slightly greater frequency 
into the second category, placing a slightly greater burden upon the 
federal government to show that such legislation does not go to the 
heart of the States' ability to function as States. A good deal of 
energy regulation, particularly with regard to renewable alternative 
energy resources, arguably will fall within the third category requir-
ing a state demonstration of the threat to its separate and independ-
ent existence. Category one situations will probably be rare in the 
energy field because the federal presence in the field is a recent oc-
currence. 
B. The Form of the Federal Regulation 
The implementation of federal energy legislation at the state level 
may take one of three forms. First, the federal government may at-
tempt to implement its program through direct mandates to the 
States, requiring some action to be taken by the StateS.171 Second, 
the federal government may seek implementation of its policies by 
regulating private entities in some substantive area or a manner 
usually reserved to state and local governments, thereby preempting 
a state's decisionmaking in that area.172 Third, implementation of 
federal energy policy may be effected through the use of conditional 
grants to the stateS.17S Each of these will be considered with a view 
toward the narrowing of the National League of Cities limitation 
upon the implementation of federal energy legislation. 
1. Direct Mandates 
Once it is established that a federal regulation is directed to the 
States as States and impacts upon an integral or traditional function, 
National League of Cities, as refined by the Surface Mining Act 
Cases, requires only a showing that the challenged regulation ad-
dresses matters that are "indisputably attributes of state sovereign-
ty."174 It may be difficult to envision a federal regulation affecting 
171. See, e.g., supra note 11. 
172. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. SS 1201-1328 
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
173. See, e.g., supra note 89. 
174. 452 U.S. at 288. 
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an integral state function which does not address such attributes of 
sovereignty, and in fact, the Court has merged these two concepts on 
occasion.176 The Court, however, has established this second prong 
as an independent requirement of a claim seeking to invalidate 
legislation premised on the Commerce Clause.176 While no explana-
tion of this requirement has been offered by the Court, the reference 
to "indisputable attributes of state sovereignty" seems to be to the 
decisionmaking processes of states and their political subdivisions. 
In FERC v. Mississippi,177 the provisions of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURP A) which direct state regulatory 
agencies to consider certain proposed federal standards and to en-
force rules promulgated by the FERC,17s were challenged by the 
State of Mississippi as "commandeering" state regulatory power in 
a manner which violates the Tenth Amendment.179 The district court 
agreed, holding that Congress had exceeded its power under the 
Commerce Clause. ISO The court found the PURP A provisions invalid 
because "they constitute a direct intrusion on integral and tradi-
tional functions of the State of Mississippi."lsl The FERC and the 
Secretary of Energy appealed directly to the Supreme Court pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252, and the Court reversed, upholding the 
PURP A requirements. ls2 
Although the Supreme Court did not deny that PURP A contains 
federal mandates which directly impact on traditional state func-
tions, the Court distinguished its opinion in National League of 
Cities, which it said dealt with "the extent to which state sovereign-
ty shields States from generally applicable federal regulations. In 
PURP A, in contrast, the Federal Government attempts to use state 
regulatory machinery to advance federal goals."lsB The Court found 
PURPA's imposition on the States permissible. It did not entail the 
type of intrusion which National League of Cities sought to prohibit, 
175. In National League of Cities, the Court referred to the States' "power to determine 
the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their govern-
mental functions" as "functions essential to separate and independent existence." 426 U.S. at 
845. 
176. 452 U.S. at 288. 
177. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
178. See supra 42-55 text and notes at notes 42-55. 
179. See 452 U.S. at 288 (argument of the Appellee). 
180. _ F. Supp. _ (S.D. Miss. 1979). 
181. Id. at . 
182. 456 U.S. at 748. 
183. Id. 
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at least to the extent that the federal law simply establishes "re-
quirements for continued state activity in an otherwise preemptible 
field. "184 
Even assuming that a direct federal mandate does impermissibly 
impact upon state sovereingty, the Supreme Court in the Surface 
Mining Act Cases and the more recent case of EEOC v. Wyoming185 
stated that the Tenth Amendment will not necessarily serve as a 
limitation upon federal action if it can be shown that there is some 
demonstrably greater federal interest in upholding the federal man-
date.186 The energy area is replete with federal interests which, 
together or individually, may override state sovereignty interests. 
Examples of such federal interests include the resolution of in-
terstate disputes regarding the exploitation or distribution of energy 
resources; national security interests in reducing the nation's 
dependence on unpredictably foreign sources of energy; and the 
regulation of spillovers of adverse environmental effects of energy 
use in bordering states. 
2. Indirect Action 
The second form of federal implementation consists of federal ac-
tion which, although directed toward private entities, has the effect 
of displacing state authority in an area of traditional state govern-
mental function. Those courts and commentators who gave a broad 
reading to the intent of National League ojCities viewed this type of 
legislation as the inevitable victim of the Supreme Court's swing to 
increased recognition of state sovereignty interests meriting con-
stitutional protection.187 As the Surface Mining Act Cases revealed, 
however, the Court was unwilling to take that next logical step 
towards further limiting the federal government's powers. Instead, 
the Court reaffirmed its traditional position concerning the federal 
government's power to displace state authority and restated the nar-
rowness of its prior holding which was made applicable only to 
federal action directed to the "States as StateS."188 Thus, it seems 
clear that federal energy legislation directed at private entities 
184. Id. at 751. 
185. _ U.S. _, 51 U.S.L.W. 4219 (March 1, 1983). 
186. 452 U.S. at 288. 
187. See, e.g., Matsumoto, National League o/Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Im-
munity from Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 35, 76-89 (1977); Note, 
Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REv. 
1871, 1883 (1976). 
188. See supra text and notes at notes 110-35. 
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which incidentally displaces the States' authority to regulate and 
mandate conduct is a valid exercise of federal authority even if a con-
sequence of such action is the loss of revenues to the state.189 
This conclusion was affirmed in the challenge directed toward 
PURP A provisions which makes use of a variation on this form of 
implementation. Section 210 of PURP A, authorizes, inter alia, 
FERC to exempt qualified power facilities from state laws and 
regulations.190 The Supreme Court, in the FERC v. Mississippi, 
found this to be a proper form for implementing the commerce 
power legislation, stating that the "Federal Government may 
displace state regulation even though this serves to 'curtail or pro-
hibit the States' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting 
subjects the States may consider important.' "191 Current energy 
legislation, enacted during the Carter administration, makes use of 
this implementation mechanism in several other instances.192 Given 
the extensive private development of energy resources in this coun-
try, this should prove a valuable form of implementation in the 
future. 
3. Conditional Grants 
The last form of implementation is the one most commonly used in 
federal legislation-that of making conditional grants. Pursuant to a 
variety of federal programs, including energy legislation, Congress 
has made funds available to state and local governments contingent 
on the satisfaction of certain stated conditions.198 This is cUrrently 
the most problematic of the implementation mechanisms because no 
court has determined what, if any, limits the Tenth Amendment im-
poses upon the spending clause power. Despite the potential for 
serious interference with state and local decisionmaking in critical 
areas, the conditional grant generally has been held to be a permissi-
ble vehicle for the effectuation of federal policies.194 
189. 452 U.s. at 292 n.33. 
190. 5 210(e), 16 U.S.C. 5 824a-3(e) (1974 & Supp. 1982). 
191. 456 U.S. at 747-48. 
192. See, e.g., The Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96-618, 92 Stat. 3174 at 5201 and 
92 Stat. 3180 (imposing Gas Guzzler Tax upon automobile manufacturers); The National 
Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206, 55 422-23, 92 Stat. 
3259-63 (setting efficiency standards for certain products and imposing civil penalties upon 
private manufacturers who fail to meet the standards). 
193. See 8'Upra note 59 (statutes cited). 
194. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937) (conditional grants 
which induce rather than coerce state participation are valid); Oklahoma v. United States Civil 
Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1947)(application of Hatch Act to the states as a condi-
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In National League ojCities, the Court declined to reach the ques-
tion whether its newly established doctrine extended beyond con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause to congressional 
power under the Spending Clause granted by the Constitution.196 
Given the entrenched position of the conditional federal grant in in-
tergovernmental dealings in this country, it is not surprising that the 
lower courts have generally refused to extend National League oj 
Cities in the face of challenges to federal conditional grants.196 
Nonetheless, many of the same concerns which underlie the Court's 
decision in National League oj Cities are present in the conditional 
grant situation, and the Supreme Court has recently suggested the 
possibility that Tenth Amendment protected sovereignty interests 
may limit the Spending Power.197 
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,198 a case 
which was decided on due process and equal protection grounds,199 
the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of Congress's power to 
legislate pursuant to the spending clause powers.200 The Court af-
firmed the traditional view that such legislation is "much in the 
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to 
comply with federally imposed conditions"201 and Congress's power 
"rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the 
terms of the 'contract.' "202 The Court, however, also referred in a 
footnote to "limits on the power of Congress to impose conditions on 
tion for receiving federal highway funds does not violate Tenth Amendment); Ivanhoe Irrig. 
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968); 
Law v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 561, 569 (1974). 
195. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. 
196. E.g., New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240,245 (1st 
Cir. 1980) (state unemployment compensation system must conform to federal guidelines as a 
condition of federal tax credit); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 
98-99 & n.20 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Pennsylvania has accepted federal funds and has thus consented 
to federally mandated standards for treatment and habilitation of the developmentally dis-
abled"), rev'd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981); North Carolina v. Califano, 445 F. 
Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (requiring state to amend its constitution to facilitate compliance 
with federal conditions attached to health grants upheld), affd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978). 
197. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, _ U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981). 
198. In Pennhurst residents of a state facility for the care and treatment of the mentally 
retarded brought a class action against the hospital and various officials responsible for its 
operation. The residents alleged that conditions at the hospital were "unsanitary, inhumane 
and dangerous" and denied them due process and equal protection in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and certain rights conferred by federal statute. Id. at 1534. 
199. Id. at 1536-47, 1540-42. 
200. Id. at 1535. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at n.13. See Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of Na-
tional Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694-1716 (1981). 
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the States pursuant to its Spending Power," and cited among other 
cases, National League ofCities.20s 
If the Pennhurst decision can be interpreted as signalling a new 
willingness on the part of the Court to extend the Tenth Amendment 
limitation to the area of congressional spending powers, serious 
doubts may be raised with respect to the federal government's abili-
ty to implement federal energy policy in its present form. None-
theless, assuming that to be true, and that conditional grants are no 
more promising a vehicle than commerce power legislation for man-
dating state implementation of federal policy,204 conditional grants 
certainly should be no less promising. Thus, the Court imposed re-
quirements and the inherent limitations of the National League of 
Cities doctrine applicable to commerce powers should also be ap-
plicable in spending powers cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Federal energy legislation in the last decade has attempted to deal 
with some peculiarly national concerns, but has done so in the con-
text of an area of law historically dominated by the decentralized 
decisionmaking of the States. Because of these factors, such legisla-
tion raises the issue of federalism dealt with in National League of 
Cities and subsequent Tenth Amendment cases. While those cases 
express a heightened sensitivity to certain state sovereignty in-
terest, and a consequent limitation on congressional commerce 
power, the picture is by no means as bleak for proponents of federal 
action in the energy fields as some commentators had painted it 
following National League of Cities. In its most recent opinions in 
the area, the Court has narrowly applied the "integral governmental 
function" standard, and has, for the first time, suggested that even 
direct federal mandates to the States which appear to impact upon 
traditional state functions may not interfere impermissibly with at-
tributes of state sovereignty if they deal with an otherwise preemp-
tible field. Moreover, the Court since National League of Cities has 
recognized that substantial federal interests may override state 
sovereignty interests, and has refused to extend National League of 
Cities to legislation which displaces state activity where it is directed 
to private entities and not the "States as States." Much energy 
203. Stewart, supra note 127 at 1262. 
204. See supra text and notes at notes 121-82. 
904 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:875 
regulation is supported by strong federal interests, arguably suffi-
cient to override state sovereignty interests. IDtimately, the Court's 
recent decisions leave open the possibility of well-structured federal 
energy legislation, which may constitutionally direct state implemen-
tation of national goals and standards. 
